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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
No. 11-3511 
_________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KEMO VAUGHN,  
also known as HASSAN EPPS; 
also known as ERIC HILL 
 
Kemo Vaughn, 
                           Appellant 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-10-cr-00646-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
 
 _______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 21, 2012 
 
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL, and HARDIMAN, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Filed: September 24, 2012) 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
In this appeal, Kemo Vaughn challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion 
to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that Vaughn contends was invalid, 
overbroad, and not executed in good faith. 
I. 
 On May 24, 2010 the Philadelphia police executed a search warrant on Vaughn’s 
residence at 3829 Brown Street, Philadelphia.  That search was part of a murder 
investigation in which the lead suspect was Keenan Coleman, an associate of Vaughn’s.  
In the affidavit supporting the request for the warrant to search Vaughn’s residence, the 
police provided the following facts:  (1) Coleman was a member of the Thompson 
University gang, “a known violent drug trafficking organization,” and Vaughn was 
known to associate with members of the gang, App. at 15; (2) a known civilian witness 
identified Coleman as the shooter in the murder; (3) a different known civilian witness 
informed police that Coleman “hides weapons” at Vaughn’s residence, App. at 16; (4) 
police officers observed Coleman entering Vaughn’s residence on “numerous occasions” 
over the preceding twenty-one months and as recently as five days before the affidavit 
was sworn, leading police to be believe that Coleman had “unrestricted access” to 
Vaughn’s residence and might hide evidence or conceal himself from police there, App. 
at 17; and (5) officers observed Coleman carrying items into Vaughn’s residence on 
“many occasions,” App. at 16.  On the basis of the affidavit setting forth those facts, a 
magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the seizure of “[t]he person of Keenan 
[Coleman], any firearms, pistols or similar weapons, any ammunition for firearms or 
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similar weapons, proof of residence, ownership, occupancy [sic] any identification or 
other papers of occupants or residents.”  App. at 14. 
 When police executed the warrant at Vaughn’s residence, they found and seized 
crack cocaine, marijuana, drug packaging materials, Keenan Coleman’s driver’s license, 
ammunition, and three firearms – two semiautomatic handguns and a rifle.  Vaughn 
moved to suppress that evidence, but the District Court denied his motion.  Vaughn 
subsequently pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute, one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and 
one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, while reserving his right to 
challenge the District Court’s suppression ruling on appeal.  
II. 
 We exercise plenary review of a district court’s ruling on a suppression motion.1
Even assuming that the search warrant was issued without probable cause or was 
overly broad, the District Court did not err in ruling the evidence seized admissible if the 
executing officers acted in good faith.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-24 
(1984).  A judge-issued warrant typically establishes good faith.  Id. at 922.  However 
evidence may be suppressed when, inter alia, the affidavit so lacked indicia of probable 
cause that belief in its existence was entirely unreasonable or the warrant on its face 
  
United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2001). 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Based on Vaughn’s 
timely notice of appeal, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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failed to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized.  Hodge, 246 
F.3d at 308.   
Vaughn argues that the warrant was not executed in good faith because the 
supporting affidavit is so lacking indicia of probable cause that belief that probable cause 
existed is entirely unreasonable.  We reject this argument. 
The affidavit rebuts Vaughn’s contention that the warrant was utterly unsupported 
by indicia of probable cause to believe that Coleman or weapons would be found at 
Vaughn’s residence.  The affidavit cites a known informant as telling the investigating 
officers that Coleman hid weapons at Vaughn’s residence.  This witness statement is 
supported by the investigative officers’ observations of Coleman entering and exiting 
Vaughn’s house on “numerous occasions” and carrying things into Vaughn’s house.  
App. at 16.  This is sufficient “indicia of probable cause” to support a good faith belief in 
the validity of the warrant.  See, e.g., United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 557 (3d Cir. 
2010); see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1250 (2012). 
With respect to Vaughn’s additional argument that nothing in the warrant or 
affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that “any and all weapons or ammunition 
found . . . would be contraband or evidence of crime,” Appellant’s Br. at 32, we note that 
nothing in the warrant or the affidavit rules out any class of firearm as the murder weapon 
or is incompatible with the use of multiple weapons during the murder.  Moreover, given 
the information about Coleman’s gang association and his frequenting of the house and 
carrying “items” in and out of the house contained in the affidavit, the executing officers 
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could have reasonably believed that Coleman might possess additional illegal firearms 
beyond that used in the murder.  See Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1246. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not err in 
denying Vaughn’s motion to suppress.  We affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
